



Support to the EU CBRN Center of Excellence for Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security

Report from the Project's Inception Meeting

MEMBERS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE AND THE WORKING GROUP OF P-60 "SUPPORT TO THE EU CBRN ECA COE IN NUCLEAR SECURITY" MET IN NAIROBI ON 23 FEBRUARY 2017. THIS REPORT OFFERS HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION, FEEDBACK FROM PARTICIPANTS, EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONIALS AS WELL AS COMMUNICATION MATERIALS, RELATED TO THE EVENT.





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The meeting on 23 February 2017 in Nairobi followed the deliberations of the eight Round table for the Eastern and Central Africa National Focal Points (20-22 February) within the framework of the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE).

Welcoming remarks were made by Eddie Maier, Deputy Head of Unit, B5, Stability, Security, Development and Nuclear Safety, DEVCO, European Commission, and Joseph Maina, Head of regional Secretariat, EU CBRN CoE for Eastern and Central Africa, Kenyan Radiation Protection Board. E. Maier recalled how Project 60 came into being by reminding the initial idea and the ensuing discussions at several meetings of the EU CBRN NFPs that ended with the circulation of a draft project proposal and its final approval. J. Maina greeted all the participants and encouraged a lively discussion during the meeting. Jean-Pierre Bardoul, IcSP and EU CBRN CoE coordinator, EU Delegation, made a statement, calling on the six remaining participating states that had not yet presented Letters of expression of interest for taking part in P-60 to accelerate the process of adhesion.

Kamen Velichkov, ISTC P-60 Manager, offered a detailed presentation on Project-60: Purpose and Objectives, Organizational Framework, Implementation Schedule, Quality Assurance Plan and Key Performance Indicators. He outlined P-60 major deliverables, namely: recommendations on legal and regulatory framework for the management of nuclear material; recommendations on RN Incidents Response Plans; Inventories of radiological material, orphan sources and seized materials; Action plans for the recovery of orphan sources; lists of equipment to be delivered for training purposes and for use by enforcement and border management staff; capacity building through training and exercises; provision of a web-based communication platform through a dedicated web-site to facilitate regional contacts.

African countries to jointly improve nuclear safety and security



“Experts on radiological and nuclear (RN) issues from state institutions and research communities of eleven African countries are convening in Nairobi to kick start a new project on nuclear safety and security in the region. They will share information about existing legal frameworks, institutional mechanisms and national policies on nuclear safety and security; will voice their needs of specialized training, field exercises, and equipment to better respond to RN risks; and will discuss ways and means to address efficiently the challenges of managing RN sources in all industrial and medical domains, and of ensuring safe trans-border transportation of RN materials.”



The Experience of Kazakhstan: Pavel Aristov, Technical supervisor of the Centre for Complex Ecological Studies, Institute of Nuclear Physics – Kazakhstan, provided an overview of Kazakhstan’s legal framework and policies in the field of nuclear security and safety, dwelling specifically of the search for and treatment of radioactive orphan sources and on the training programs to be conducted by the Nuclear Security Centre in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Overview of the Nuclear Security Issues in the ECA region: Nicholas Kasprzyk, Analyst, ISS, South Africa, provided an overview of the major international initiatives engaging African countries in non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards. He assessed the reporting of the P-60 participating states to the UNSCR 1540 Committee, as well as obligations arising from the Treaty of Pelindaba on the establishment of the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. He described as a major challenge the insufficient local capacity to absorb the international assistance programs.



Tour de table discussion ensued providing participating countries with an opportunity to comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the existing legal frameworks, institutional mechanisms and national policies, including national radioactive waste management policies, in their respective countries, as well as to express preferences for training, field exercises, and equipment.

Burundi: Major issue is raising the public awareness about radioactive materials used in some of the industries (e.g. textile), and in mining (e.g. gold mines in North-West Burundi), as well as the possibility of water contamination. Burundi lacks specific RN legislation. It is convinced that sub-regional harmonization of RN governing norms is a must. Burundi looks for transfer of knowledge and know-how to secure its extractive industries. Assistance in capacity building is also needed to underpin the inter-ministerial cooperation on RN matters that has already started. Training should include 5 participants per line ministry, totalling 50 participants all together. P-60 should help strengthen the participation culture;

DR Congo (DRC): DRC initiated P-60 for a number of reasons. The country possesses plentiful of mineral resources and uranium. Extraction of these materials is quite intensive, while the people who are engaged are exposed to the danger of contamination. Pollution of water resources is also an issue. Added to this



“... Many reasons made us decide that **Burundi** should be involved at regional level with this project. We do expect that Project 60 will contribute to better sensitize the public, educate our experts, and help with equipment at the cross points on the borders. We currently can rely on some national experts. We do expect them to become a core team that will be able to train and prepare other specialists and to initiate a sensitization effort on nuclear security matters at a national scale.”

H.E. Ambassador S. Karonkano, National Focal Point

“This project has come at a very opportune time, when **the Seychelles** is in a process of finalising its regulations regarding nuclear safety and security; what we have discussed today will be very useful for us back in Seychelles.”

Mr. K. Aglae, Director, Ministry of Health

are the long boundaries with nine neighbouring countries and the associated risk of illicit trafficking of RN materials. Hence the importance for Congo of the regional dimensions of P-60. Congo possesses one of the oldest in Africa nuclear reactors for research purposes, dating from the 1960-s. That is why DRC needs international assistance in capacity building. Even more acute is the need to educate the public at large about the risks associated to illegal primitive forms of mining of radioactive minerals. Recently the government has issued an Act to close these mines and to discourage commercialization of minerals. DRC needs detection equipment to fight illicit trafficking. In terms of legal framework, the RN matters are slightly better covered in comparison to the other components of the CBRN trio. Several new laws are on the table for the government to consider. While the country has begun to draft a CBRN Response plan, currently each line ministry or institution has its own emergency plan, and, regrettably, radiological materials are not very well covered in these standing operational procedures, at times – totally absent. Research on orphan sources will be very welcome. Congo is a vast country and some extractive industries operate with little or no control. The regional dimension of the problem is what makes DRC search for regional solutions. In this respect a workshop in Arusha, Tanzania, allowed for exchange of useful information. However, cooperation among nuclear regulators remain insufficient. Egypt offered to DRC training on the use of radiological detectors. In DRC, the coordinator for the UNSCR 1540 is the same as for CBRN matters in general, so no further recommendations are needed in that regard. In summary, DRC has proven the availability of political will to improve the RN.





Ethiopia (observer): the country has strong and officially declared, by a Letter of interest, desire to participate in P-60. Addis Ababa joined the CBRN ECA CoE after the Project 60 has been conceived and elaborated, but Ethiopia hopes to join it as early as possible and benefit from its objectives. The country has established a Radiation Protection Authority. The Ministry of Science is the line ministry in charge of CBRN matters. Ethiopia believes that similar regulatory organizations in the member countries of the initiative in the neighbouring countries should come together to address the problems jointly. Addis Ababa hopes to reap bigger benefits through security activities in the region, not only in Ethiopia.



Ghana: A country of mining, oil production and rapid industrialization, Ghana pays special attention to RN security. The Atomic Energy Commission came into existence back in the 1960-s. The country has received up until now three IAEA missions and received some help from the US. One of the implemented recommendations was to ensure the independent status of the nuclear regulator. Since 2015 the regulator chairs the Nuclear Security Committee under the National Security Council. Under the AEC there exists a Nuclear Security Centre that provides training for members of various organizations, including the consumer protection associations. Accra has a functioning radiotherapy facility. The waste management facility was rehabilitated with US assistance. Canada also had a USD 15 million program for Ghana and Malaysia. Ghana has acquired yet another type of experience when developing and teaching the programs of the IAEA Schools of Nuclear and Allied Sciences, namely: civil servants from relevant government agencies lack incentive to follow the RN courses. It will be much preferable if they get a certificate at graduation that will be taken into consideration in their carrier development. Ghana hosted an IAEA workshop on crime scene management. The existing National Emergency Response Plan has no nuclear security component, and Accra invited an IAEA team to revise the document. The country has a national waste management facility. With regard to orphan sources, G has an inventory and the ability to track movement of sources. There is a new law establishing a national nuclear regulatory body and subsidiary regulations. The government Information Services Department has to make this legislation known to the population. The issues of emergency responses are treated through the prism of the IAEA Convention on Emergency Response. In terms of equipment Ghana will favour mobile detectors to be used at the sixty-two border crossings. Other much needed equipment includes: Gama – spectrometers, alarm monitoring tools, etc. In order to raise the overall level of the security culture it is precisely members of the elite that should be familiarized with the topics, including through P-60. Ghana has embarked on the preparation of a National Nuclear Emergency Response Plan and plans to establish an emergency secretariat. Public awareness on NR issues is a precondition for the notable impact of such organizational measures, and unfortunately awareness is not good. At the same time, G has already a national Action Plan for the



fulfilment of the requirements of UNSCR 1540. The country has established its Nuclear Regulation Authority. It also has acquired experience in secure transportation of high- and low enriched uranium.

Kenya: Kenya has been in the forefront of the regional efforts to reach higher level of nuclear security. The initial piece of legislation – the Radiation Protection Act of 1982 did not reflect sufficiently the nuclear security issues and had to be amended to include physical protection of nuclear installations. The Regulation Board played a positive role in attracting attention to nuclear security. Since 2010



every regulation in this field has to go through Parliament. Kenya has a lot to share because the country has a solid and well developed regulatory infrastructure, in terms of legal and regulatory frameworks. It has made use of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) designed to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the national regulatory infrastructures. Drawing on such expertise, Kenya managed in one hundred days to put up a skeleton regulating system. Therefore, the management is in place, but there still should be an increase of trained technical staff. Parallel but isolated from one another processes have to be integrated. In terms of inventory building, Kenya uses the RAIS software plus a back-up system. Its inventory has been verified by an international mission. Also, search and secure programs have been used, particularly in the scrap industry. Kenya has quite a number of orphan sources that were recovered. It disposes with a state-of-the-art storage facility for these sources. The government is to declare this facility as a security installation in the official journal. Such an act will allow for waste from elsewhere to be transferred to it. Nairobi has worked on an inventory of near surface depository. For Kenya,



“Kenya has a lot to share because the country has a solid and well developed regulatory infrastructure. We have a very good enforcement practice – it is a best practice within the African countries. Our expectations from the Project are to enhance our capacities and our infrastructure capabilities to be able to handle more regulatory activities.”

*Mr. J. Maina, Director,
Radiation Protection Board,
Head of Regional Secretariat,
EU CBRN CoE ECA*

“Project 60 is in line with the National Action Plan, developed in **Uganda** under Project 33. So, we believe it will enhance the ongoing activities that we have already planned like the waste management facility, the emergency preparedness; we believe that it has come at a right time and it will boost the efforts that we are already putting in.”

*Mr. J. Burungi, Radiation
Protection Officer, Atomic
Energy Council*



“When I look at the terms of reference of the project, I can see that every critical point has been well taken care of in the envisaged activities. The written document could be corroborated with the reality on the ground in **Ethiopia**. I hope the project not only helps build the capacity of each participating country but also provides an opportunity for similar organizations in the member countries of the initiative to bring their resources and fight these problems together.”

Mr. A. Senbeta, National Focal Point

“**Malawi** looks forward for this project to assist us with knowledge – in terms of developing the emergency response plan, as well as with the table top exercises – in terms of training to react in emergency.”

Mr. W. Msiska, Inspector, Environmental Affairs Department

border surveillance equipment is the most needed one. There exists an Institute for Science and Technology that offers training. Approximately 30 people work at the Kenyan Radiation Protection Board (KRPB). Kenya stands ready to share its best practices in regulation enforcement. The support it gets from the US DoD and DoE is assessed twice a year.

J. Maina, Head of the Regional Secretariat, KRPB, added that Kenya may seek to benefit from P-60 recommendations in the field of nuclear regulatory framework and provision of services. In turn, P-60 could become a vehicle for Kenya to share its experience e.g. in enforcement.

Malawi: Malawi is committed to participation in P-60 and soon will send a Letter of expression of interest. It stands ready to host training and field exercises, on yellow cake transportation safety, in particular. Malawi itself extracts uranium ore and also serves as a transit country. It has developed regulations on uranium ore transport and seeks harmonization with neighbouring states. Malawi is planning to develop an Emergency Response Plan and this is one of the activities under Project 60 that interests Malawi most. Under the existing Atomic Energy Act the police was empowered to enact regulations. Malawi’s Ministry of Justice is preparing to submit for ratification the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Nuclear Security Safeguards. A major legislative gap is the absence of regulations to govern uranium mining and the use of radiological sources. The country does not have a waste storage. This results in a situation where the authorities know where orphan sources are to be found but do not want to recover them for lack of disposal facilities. While drafting an Emergency Response Plan Malawi drew on assistance by IAEA AFRA project. A public advocacy campaign will be very useful among the policy-makers and the public at large. Crime scene management is a very desirable topic for training. Customs and border officials lack equipment to monitor RN materials movement through the prolonged border with Mozambique. Ideally, Malawi would aim at single border posts with Mozambique. The country also pins some hope on SADC to be able to coordinate policies of neighbouring southern African states.



Namibia: Namibia is going through a period of revising its existing legislation relevant to RN matters, and of drafting new laws. The difficulties to create an inventory of sources are numerous and longstanding. Main among these is the need of electronic means to find the orphan sources. In terms of training the civil servants of various agencies – e.g. customs – need a very basic introductory course. Countries from the region, and Namibia in particular, need to prepare to be able to absorb the assistance that is forthcoming. The same problem exists with the use of modern equipment. P-60 is also opportune for Namibia, as the country is on the eve of restructuring its regulatory authority. Namibia would like to see implemented an information system, which will facilitate the exchange and improve the regional coordination, especially in uranium mining. This system could help regulatory organs administer their functions, record data, capture it for regulatory documentation purposes and then also be able to share especially when it pertains to safeguards obligation, fixed in IAEA conventions and protocols to which the P-60 participating states are parties.

Seychelles: Seychelles, a country on a hundred and five tiny islands, has specific approaches to the RN theme. Working to identify the best position for the regulating authority in the government structure, S reached the conclusion that the RN regulatory organ should be under the Ministry of Labour, a line ministry that has less chances to be user of RN materials, as opposed to e.g. the Ministry of Health. S also took good care to incorporate nuclear safety and security into University curriculums bearing in mind the importance of public awareness about the RN challenges. Currently Seychelles is in a process of finalising its regulations with regards to nuclear safety and security. In as much as border control is concerned S faced lack of both trained cadres, and of adequate equipment.

Tanzania: The country has appointed a RN expert to take part in the P-60 Working group, but due to the lack of a NFP did not make presentation at the Inception meeting. Information was communicated through the Tanzanian Embassy in Nairobi.



“I am very happy with what I saw: the project objectives and the potential outcomes of the project. Now, we need to prepare ourselves in **Namibia**, to be able to absorb the assistance that is forthcoming. I am seeing it as a game changer. We can have the opportunity to give input into what we see happening. For me the main area that I would like to see implemented is the information system, which will facilitate the exchange between member states and improve the coordination especially in uranium mining.”

*Mr. J. Eiman, Deputy
Director, National Radiation
Protection Authority*



“DR Congo has initiated this project because of many reasons. Grasping the problems of transportation and management of radioactive materials, other countries have joined and thus made the project regional. As such it was presented to the European Commission. What are our expectations? Increase the capabilities of our experts, improve the management of the traffic of the sensitive materials at the borders, ensure a safe and secure transportation of nuclear material.”

*Dr. E. Booto Bokonda
Wabele, National Focal Point*

Rwanda: Rwanda is trying to establish regulatory framework and to train those involved in the area. Rwanda is new comer in the field. A ministerial consultative committee prepares for Parliament an act establishing the regulatory body and its structure. For Rwanda P-60 comes at a very opportune moment. The country contemplates the establishment of a cancer therapy centre and a nuclear centre. Other sectors also require attention, e.g. mining. Rwanda is keen to improve the extractive industries. And R is determined to pursue peaceful use of nuclear technologies. There is evident necessity of assistance in capacity building, including through university programs. Public advocacy is badly needed, particularly among the political elite. The Law governing CBRN matters is brand new and will need further normative underpinning. One of measures planned is the elaboration of a National Integrated Nuclear Support Plan. Rwanda intends to benefit from its participation in the project to strengthen all five aspects of nuclear security, namely registration, detection, responsiveness, prevention, and sustainability of the sector.



Uganda: Uganda has sent a Letter of expression of interest for participation in Project 60 and considers it to be a continuation of what has already been planned in the National Action Plan, developed under Project 33. These measures include the setup of a waste management facility and enhanced emergency preparedness. Uganda has a Nuclear Security Act and in 2012 established an Atomic Energy Council. Discussion have begun on the construction of a NPP. Progress has been registered on the question on the compilation of an inventory of RN sources, in both Category 1 and in Category 2. The newly arriving sources are registered in a due manner. To improve detection Uganda



intends to deploy equipment and trained personnel at border points; to seek better intelligence on illicit trafficking of RN materials; to establish a Calibration Lab for RN detection equipment, as well as a fully equipped environmental monitoring lab and an operational nuclear forensics lab. A major gap is the lack of RN waste management facility. In terms of prevention and response Uganda works to equip and train first responders' teams for Radiological Emergencies and ensure their operability through exercises and drills, as well as to establish a Mobile Expert Support Team to respond to radiological emergencies. Public awareness remains an issue. The Atomic Energy Council has decided for the first time to put in place nuclear security measures during the traditional celebrations of the National Martyr's Day that gather each year on 3 June approximately five million people.

Zambia: The Radiation Protection Authority is the only body that regulates the use of nuclear and radioactive materials in the country. It carries out inspections, oversees the radioactive waste management and bears the responsibility for enforcement of the regulations. Zambia has declared in an official Letter its desire to participate in P-60; and looks at the objectives and the activities that have been outlined in the workplan as being compatible with and complementary to what the country is currently working on in its regulatory infrastructure. Nuclear security is not fully addressed in the relevant Act of Parliament, while administrative regulations also do not reflect sufficiently nuclear security topics and safety guidelines. An Action Plan is being implemented from 2014 on Self-Assessment for Regulatory Infrastructure for Safety (SARIS). The task of preparation of an Emergency Response Plan is pending. In terms of orphan sources, Zambia tries to make use of the RAIS system to account for all the sources through an authorization procedure. An effective measure for control are the periodic onsite inspections that include in the inspection teams also members of the civil society. A major impediment is the lack of a permanent storage facility. US DoE donated some border monitoring equipment. Enforcement regulations for nuclear security are currently being reviewed. Zambia established an Interim Committee to draft legislature on disaster relief and preparedness that should also consider nuclear response plans and nuclear security detection strategies. Zambia is supporter of regional cooperation to enhance



“We normally call the press to tell them what we are going to do, so that later we can explain it to the public. And this is what I want to do with project 60 as well, because I believe that this is the only way to make the public aware of the objectives and the activities of the project. We are always ready to share, we are even ready to bring people to **Ghana** to train and help them.”

*Prof. G. Emi-Reynolds, AG,
Director-General, RN Expert*

“We are very pleased to see this project coming, because **Rwanda** is now trying to establish regulations and to train those involved in the area to make sure that we have in place safety and security framework. Rwanda is new in this area and for us this project comes at the right time.”

*Mr. J. Nsengiyaremye,
Energy Policy Specialist,
Ministry of Infrastructure*



nuclear security. For this aim, Zambia has concluded bilateral Memorandums of Understanding with DRC.

Adoption of the P-60 Work plan and Key Performance Indicators.

(the draft documents were made available to the members of the Steering Committee). No proposals for amendments to the documents we made at the meeting.

Introduction of MC.5.01/15B project “Support to Southern African States in Nuclear Safety.” Kamen Velichkov provided a short introduction to the MC.5.01/15B project on support to SADC in nuclear safety in four countries, participants in P-60 (Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, and Namibia). He outlined the cooperation envisaged with Southern African Development Community including through a provision of a web-based electronic system to trace trans-border transportation of uranium ore.

Concluding Remarks: Dr Eddie Maier, Deputy Head of Unit, Head of Sector CBRN, DEVCO, European Commission provided comments on the complementarity of P-60 and MC 5.01/15B projects. He pointed out that P-60 will be implemented in coordination with US DoE and will aim to introduce IAEA standards. He outlined the importance of the locally accumulated experience by countries like Ghana, DRC and Kenya and the crucial role of the African partners. National CBRN teams should cooperate with the respective EU Delegations; they could even meet at their premises. Public awareness on nuclear security in general, and on the purposes of the two projects should be boosted. Further progress of P-60 may be discussed and assessed at the upcoming CBRN CoE NFP’s meeting (Brussels, 16-18 May 2017).



“This project fits well with how we are working on the review and the amendments of the regulations. I believe that at the end if this project, we would achieve much because as a country, **Zambia** is experiencing several expansions and improvement in technology, especially the use of nuclear science and technology. We are going to benefit from the project and it is my wish it will continue to support us in one way or another specially in certain areas where we feel there are gaps and we need improvements.”

Mr. E. Miyombo, Radiation Safety Officer, Radiation Protection Authority



“I think it is a very good project, very useful for the countries. They showed very nice commitment to work together. They already started to prepare themselves, so I am more than sure that it will be a big success and I hope will bring an impact on the radiological and nuclear management of sources, transport, and on nuclear security in general”.

Dr. E. Maier, Deputy Head of Unit, European Commission DG DEVCO

“The inception meeting was very interesting, very clear in explaining the objectives, the activities, the work packages, the expected outputs and the interactions with all the member states that are participating in this project. I hope it will have the success that it deserves.”

Mr. G. P. Caponera, AESA Consortium Director

FEEDBACK FROM PARTICIPANTS:

Out of the 36 participants at the Inception meeting, 27 were representatives of the participating countries. Some countries were represented by two experts (the NFP and a RN expert), others by one national representative only, while Kenya – as a host country – was represented by 6 experts.

Eighteen (18) *End of Meeting Questionnaires* filled in by respondents were submitted to the project management: fifteen (15) by national representatives – some countries opted to fill in one questionnaire, in other cases both participants from a specific country filled in the questionnaire. Three (3) of the external experts have also provided answers.

Overall feedback: All 18 respondents agree or strongly agree that the inception meeting was well organized and covered all aspects of the future project activities.

Fourteen (14) respondents think that they were able to express their opinions, four (4) neither agree, nor disagree.

All 18 respondents are overall satisfied or strongly satisfied with the meeting.

Specific feedback: All 18 agree or strongly agree that the presentation of the project, its goals and objectives, was good and comprehensive.

Thirteen (13) respondents agree or strongly agree that the discussion of the Key Performance Indicators and the Quality Assurance Plan was substantial. Three (3) neither agree, nor disagree, 1 didn't answer.

Fourteen (14) respondents agree or strongly agree that the management set up, the work plan and the schedule of activities are clear and realistic, two (2) are neutral, 1 disagree, 1 didn't respond.

Initial expectations: All 18 respondents agree or strongly agree that the project will critically contribute to strengthening the nuclear safety and security policies and practices;

All 18 agree or strongly agree that will personally further master knowledge and competences in the RN and related issues;

Seventeen (17) respondents are determined or strongly determined to share good practices, lessons and experiences with all partner countries; 1 didn't answer.



SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS:

The specific recommendations address various aspects of the implementation of Project 60 – from prioritising activities, to specific expectations of participating countries, to the principles of stakeholders’ engagement to the organizational set-up and the logistics.

- Several respondents emphasized the principles of engagement and the actors to be involved (See bullets 1 to 6 in the box on p.2): local expertise, inclusive participation, dedicated individuals as drivers of activities, targeted actions to ensure buy-in from political leaders and policy-makers, national ownership.
- Three recommendations relate to advocacy/awareness rising, suggesting specific events targeting policy makers, as well as an overall clear cut communication and awareness rising plan.
- Three recommendations relate to the work plan and planned activities, requesting achievable, realistic activities in a well thought timetable. One respondent recommends to review the work plan every year, apparently with the idea to adjust it to emerging needs.
- Several recommendations relate to mapping country specific needs, making sure to tailor the assistance and ensure the less-advanced countries move faster to catch up with the more advanced. One recommendation is to conduct yearly country assessments (to track changes and improvements).
- Several recommendations prioritise trainings amongst the envisaged activities, while the expectations from the trainings are to be realistic and to not only increase human capabilities but to also help apply relevant legislation. Only one country expects provision of equipment.
- Few recommendations address the organizational/administration/logistical aspects: better communication and distribution of documents, transparency, documents in French language provided to French speaking participants.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Three recommendations relate to logistical and organizational matters: timely communication amongst working group members, who have access to all materials and documents, while sensitive information is kept confidential.
- Two recommendations address the implementation model: interaction with technical experts is important, African unique conditions and situations should be accounted for; strong emphasis on **capacity building**.
- Few recommendations highlight the (perceived) rationale and philosophy for the project: it needs continuous engagement of all stakeholders; **regional approach is critical**; ensuring **sustainability** of RN risk management after project’s end is very important.
- One recommendation that reflects the situation at the Project’s departure point, could be summarized as follows: The [participating] countries are at different levels of preparation and achievements in the RN domain. This situation requires [tailored] support to attain adequate levels of readiness in this field during the project’s implementation in order to advance regionally.

ANNEXES: PRESS INFORMATION

1. PRE-INCEPTION MEETING ALERT

PROJECT 60



ISTC expands its geographical reach, helps African countries improve nuclear safety and security

Astana, 17 February 2017. Experts on radiological and nuclear (RN) issues from state institutions and research communities of eleven African countries are convening in Nairobi to kick start a new project on nuclear safety and security in the region. They will share information about existing legal frameworks, institutional mechanisms and national policies on nuclear safety and security; will voice their needs of specialized training, field exercises, and equipment to better respond to RN risks; and will discuss ways and means to address efficiently the challenges of managing RN sources in all industrial and medical domains, and of ensuring safe trans-border transportation of RN materials. The new project is titled *Support to the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Center of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) for Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security* and involves the following countries: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, The Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Namibia. The overall long-term objective of the project is to strengthen and harmonize the nuclear regulatory frameworks in the participating countries, to enhance their nuclear safety and security and to support their efforts to fulfill the international safeguards obligations they have assumed under a plethora of UN and multilateral treaties and conventions. The project will be implemented by the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) with over 20 years of experience of working on CBRN issues. As a host country and proactive member of the ISTC, Kazakhstan is expected to share expertise with partners from the Eastern and Central Africa region during the implementation of the new project.

The project's inception gathering on 23 February will follow a two-day round table meeting for the Eastern and Central Africa National Focal Points (20-22 February) within the framework of the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) initiative. The International Science and Technology Centre is a co-organizer of the round table meeting, convened in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, the host country to the Eastern and Central Africa CBRN CoE Regional Secretariat. Representatives from the European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG-DEVCO), the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Union Delegation to Kenya, the UN Office in Nairobi, UNICRI and AESA On-Site Technical Assistance (OSA) will also attend the meeting.

The project *Support to the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Center of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) for Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security* within the framework of the EU Instrument contributing to Peace and Security, features as Number 60 in the long list of projects that have been initiated within the [CBRN Centers of Excellence initiative](#) of the European Union. The ISTC will be implementing this project in parallel with a similar initiative, namely *Support to Southern African States in Nuclear Safety and Safeguards* under the EU Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. Funded by the EU and conceived as complementary to each other, the two initiatives illustrate the internationally recommended "Triple S" approach addressing simultaneously the nuclear safety, safeguards and security issues.

Source: <http://istc.int/en/article/19894>



2. AFTER MEETING PRESS RELEASE

Pledging to Share and Collaborate: Eleven African Countries and their Supporting Partners Kicked off a new Project to Increase Regional Nuclear Safety and Security



The Inception meeting of a new project that will boost nuclear safety and security in the region of Eastern and Central Africa, offered ample opportunities to the representatives of national regulatory bodies, scientific and research institutes from eleven African countries and to their partners from European institutions and supporting organizations, to chart a road map for their joint endeavour. As a convener of the meeting in Nairobi at the end of February, the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) – the project’s implementing partner – presented the guiding

principles, working schedule, main activities and expected results of the initiative, titled Support to the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Center of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) for Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security.

The experts on radiological and nuclear (RN) issues from the participating countries shared information about existing legal frameworks, institutional mechanisms and national policies on nuclear safety and security; they approved an initial outline for specialized trainings and field exercises that will increase their capabilities to better respond to RN risks; and agreed that the project’s envisaged activities can help them better address the challenges of managing RN sources in all industrial and medical domains, and of ensuring safe trans-border transportation of RN materials.

The following countries will be collaborating along the implementation of the project: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, The Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Namibia. They can rely on applying the expertise of renowned institutions from around the world, that are ready to offer support and assistance. For example, the Institute of Nuclear Physics of Kazakhstan and the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa have both being invited in Nairobi to present their achievements, areas of expertise and comparative advantages in the legal, scientific, and managerial aspects of the nuclear and radiological safety and security.

“For us, the project comes at a right time”, said on the side of the Inception meeting the representative of **Rwanda**. “Our country is now trying to establish a regulatory framework and to train those involved in RN issues”. “A very opportune timing”, echoed the representative of **the Seychelles**, “when we are finalizing our regulation on nuclear safety and security”. The representative of **Uganda** made a similar assessment: “the project will boost the efforts that we are already putting in establishing a RN waste management facility and in emergency preparedness”.

Two representatives stressed that the project’s anticipated interventions fit well with on-going activities in their countries: for **Malawi**, the development of an emergency response plan, for **Zambia**, the review and amendments of the legal and regulatory frameworks. Some countries expressed explicitly their willingness to share knowledge, experiences and good practices. “We are even ready to bring people to **Ghana**, to train, to help them”, assured the national focal point from Accra. The representative of **Kenya**, **prof. Joseph Maina**, who is also the head of the Regional Secretariat of the EU CBRN Center of Excellence for Eastern and Central Africa asserted: “Kenya has a lot to share because the country has a solid and well developed regulatory infrastructure. It has a state of art in



the region storage facility for orphan sources and a good enforcement practice – it is a best practice within the African countries.”

The representative of **Burundi** pointed at a key element, which made the participation of his country in the initiative a must, namely – its regional scope; and the representative of **Ethiopia** concurred that “this kind of project not only helps build the capacity of each participating country but also provides an opportunity for similar organizations in neighbouring countries to bring their resources together”. The representative of **DR Congo** reminded that its country started the talk and “other countries, realising the problems of transportation and management of radioactive materials, have joined us and thus made the project regional.”

A good example of the need of regional approach was the presentation at the Inception meeting of a similar project that the ISTC will be implementing, namely *Support to Southern African States in Nuclear Safety and Safeguards*. It will target African countries preparing to engage in mining and transportation of uranium ore concentrate through their territories: Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and Namibia. Seizing the complementarity of the two initiatives, the representative of **Namibia**, said: “Going back, we need to prepare ourselves to be able to absorb the assistance that is forthcoming. I am seeing it as a game changer. We can have the opportunity to give input into what we see happening; the main area that I would like to see implemented is the information system, which will facilitate the exchange between member states and improve the coordination especially in uranium mining. I would love to see a system whereby we could do our regulatory functions... and then also be able to share especially when it pertains to our safeguards obligation, the IAEA obligations and protocols and agreements that we have signed.”

The overall long-term objective of the project *Support to the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Center of Excellence (CBRN CoE) for Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security*, is to strengthen and harmonize the nuclear regulatory frameworks in the participating countries, to enhance their nuclear safety and security and to support their efforts to fulfill the international safeguards obligations they have assumed under a plethora of UN and multilateral treaties and conventions.

“I think it is a very good project, very useful for the countries. The level of the experts that participated in the Inception meeting was sufficiently convincing that the participating countries are really committed to working together” commented Eddie Maier, Deputy Head of Unit with the European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG-DEVCO). Representatives of the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Union Delegation to Kenya, the Secretariat of AESA On-Site Technical Assistance (OSA) have also participated in the Inception meeting as stakeholders and providers of specialised assistance.

The project *Support to the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Center of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) for Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security* within the framework of the EU Instrument contributing to Peace and Security, features as Number 60 in the long list of projects that have been initiated within the **CBRN Centers of Excellence initiative of the European Union**. The project *Support to Southern African States in Nuclear Safety and Safeguards* is initiated under the EU Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. Both projects will be implemented in parallel by the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) with over 20 years of experience of working on CBRN issues. Funded by the EU and conceived as complementary to each other, the two initiatives illustrate the internationally recommended “Triple S” approach addressing simultaneously the nuclear safety, safeguards and security issues.

Source: <http://istc.int/en/article/19903>

Support to the EU CBRN Center of Excellence for Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security

